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The new literature on the National and Regional Systems of Innovation, based on the 
approaches of the evolutionary economy, attributes an important role to the various 
different institutions that intervene in the complex processes of innovation. In this 
context, the Universities have a transcendental role in the Knowledge-based Society; 
they not only lead scientific research which, in the long term, will determine the 
technological boundaries of industry, but they also generate scientific knowledge that is 
directly applicable in the productive processes of industry and commerce. In this study 
we intend to deal with this latter question. For this, we shall make use of patents as a 
reliable indicator of technology transfer. Unlike previous studies on university patents, 
which have utilised universities or university teachers as the unit of analysis in the 
production of patents, in this study we utilise the research group, as an intermediate unit 
between the university and the academic inventor or innovator. This option is realistic 
in so far as the majority of researchers work together as members of a permanent group 
on a common line of research. With a sample of 1155 Research Groups in the 10 
universities of Andalusia, the questions investigated are the following: 
How do the human resources (academics with doctorates, graduates and support 
personnel) influence the generation of patents by universities? What is the influence of the scientific capabilities of the research group on the 
generation of university patents? 
What influence does external financing, public and private, have on the output of 
patents? 
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  The new literature on national/regional systems of innovation (Freeman, 1988; 
Nelson, 1993; Lundvall, 1992; Braczyk et al, 1998; Cooke et al 1998) based on the 
approaches of the evolutionary economy initially postulated by Nelson and Winter 
(1982), attributes a substantial role to the different institutions that intervene in this 
complex process and, above all, to the organizational aspects. University, company and 
government are identified as principal elements of the system of innovation. In a similar 
line, the thesis of the Triple Helix model (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 1997; 2000; 
Leydesdorff, 2000) establishes that the university can play an essential role in the 
process of innovation, and thus strengthen knowledge-based societies. In this modern 
conception, the universities perform three essential functions as elements of a system of 
innovation (Schartinger et al. 2002, Smith, 1995): first, they lead the general process of 
scientific research that has a long term effect on the technological frontiers of industry; 
second, they generate a type of knowledge that is directly applicable to industrial 
production processes; third, they provide the principal inputs of the process of industrial 
innovation: the specialized human resources employed by industry, or the researchers 
working in those institutions that collaborate with the private industrial sector.  
 
Our objective in this paper is to explore in detail the second of these functions 
using patents as indicator. Several research studies have demonstrated that the analysis 
of patents is a sufficiently valid and objective method for determining technology 
transfer (Archibugi, 1992, Basberg, 1987, Boitani and Ciciotti, 1990, and Trajtenberg, 
1990).  For Meyer- Krahmer and Schmoch (1998) patents show the interest in 
commercial exploitation of a new technology (...) A high share of patents on the part of 
scientific institutions can be considered a good indicator for a close relationship of 
science and industrial laboratories in the technology field”. Also the accessibility of 
patents allows a more comprehensive treatment than surveys or case studies (Henderson 
et al., 1998). 
 
  Unlike previous studies on university patents that have taken, as the unit of 
analysis in the production of patents, either the university  (Henderson et al. 1998; 
Coupe 2003), or university teachers (Agrawal and Henderson, 2002), in this study we 
utilise the research group, considered as an intermediate unit between the university and the academic inventor or innovator. This is a realistic option considering that the 
majority of researchers are integrated as members of a group following a common line 
of research; these groups are also the basic unit for regional financing of academic 
research. With a sample of 1155 Research Groups from 10 Spanish universities, the 
questions to investigate are the following: 
 
How do the human resources (academics with doctorates, graduates and support 
personnel) influence the generation of university patents? 
What is the influence of the scientific capabilities of the research group on the 
generation of university patents? 
What influence does external financing, public and private, have on the output of 
patents? 
 
  Our working proposal for the article is as follows. First we carry out a review of 
the literature on the production of technological knowledge in the universities, as 
measured by patents, and then we put forward the initial working hypotheses, the 
methodology and the data utilised. Next we present the results of testing our hypotheses. 
Finally we draw the principal conclusions. 
 
2. Previous literature and hypotheses 
 
While there is a broad literature that has confirmed the significant effects of 
universities on the economy, there are relatively few studies concerned with the causes 
underlying the generation of technological knowledge in universities, and its transfer 
into the productive economy. Recent research work of a quantitative nature has been 
centered on the technological results exploited commercially by the universities; such 
research has been quantified by means of licences (Thursby et al, 2001, Thursby and 
Thursby ,2002, 2003;, Thursby and Kemp, 2002; Friedman and Silberman, 2003). Some 
of the factors that influence the technology transfer between universities and companies 
have been demonstrated in these studies; for example, the quality of the centers in 
which the technology has been developed; the personnel of the University offices of 
technology transfer; the tradition existing in these institutions of undertaking this type 
of activity; the resources provided by the government; and location. The literature 
focusing on the causes underlying the contribution of universities to technology development and transfer utilising patents as the indicator is scarce. One of the more 
relevant studies is that of Henderson et al. (1998), who compare the university patents 
of the US during the period 1965-1988; their results show that universities tend to be 
more interested in medical and pharmaceutical technology and less in mechanical 
technology. Their analysis of quality suggests that, for recent periods, there does not 
appear to be any difference of quality between university patents and those granted to 
other types of organization. In respect of the explanatory causes of the evolution of 
university patents, they emphasize three essential aspects: the legal framework, or 
changes in the federal laws that facilitate patent applications by universities (Mowery et 
al., 2001 put this finding in doubt), increases in industrial funds destined to supporting 
university research, and the increase in the numbers of interface centers and institutions. 
Coupé (2003) has estimated a production function for university patents by means of 
empirical counting models, in which the principal explanatory factors are the academic 
expenditures on R&D, and the institutional factors considered previously by Henderson 
et al. (1998). The results of this study confirm the evidence on the institutional effects, 
in addition to the significant influence of expenditure on R&D on the output of 
university patents. Miyata (2000) empirically analyzes how North American 
universities generate results with the potential for early commercial exploitation, and 
what are the factors that determine these results, using regression models. As the 
endogenous variable, this author utilizes the number of inventions (although the results 
are not presented, according to the author, the number of patents or licenses lead to the 
same results), and as explanatory factors, the funds provided by industry, whether there 
is a tradition of relationship between the university and the particular industry, the 
quality of the research, and its relationship with the administration. Using a transversal 
sample of 69 American universities, the results of the regressions performed indicate 
that, of the explanatory variables considered, only the quality of the research and the 
existence of a traditional relationship with the industry, lead to the generation of 
significant inventions. Owen-Smith and Powell (2003) analyze the sources of North 
American universities' capacities for generating results with the potential for early 
exploitation. As possible explanatory causes of the mechanisms by which universities 
develop patents, these authors suggest know-how (the accumulation of previous patents 
or experience in the particular field), the personnel dedicated to technology transfer, and 
contractual links with companies that patent. Their model takes as endogenous variable 
the number of citations gained by a university patent in the life sciences sector (in other words, the sum of the citations in respect of patents assigned to a university, as a 
measure of the impact of the organization); the explanatory factors include several 
control variables (the presence of a Faculty of Medicine, the type of university - public 
or private -, localization), experience (number of previous patents), scientific capacity 
(number of articles), scientific impact and capacity for integration in networks. These 
authors find a positive and significant effect of the size of the portfolio of patents on the 
number of citations, of the degree of association or integration in networks and of the 
scientific publications (the academic publications are directly related to a high impact of 
university patents). 
 
  Based on the previous literature, we aim to test the following hypotheses: 
 
H1: The more human resources, in numbers and qualification, deployed by the research 
group, the more patents are generated. 
 
The human resources constitute an essential variable to be included in the 
analysis of any function of technological knowledge generation; also, in our case, the 
deployment of human resources represents a vitally important parameter because in 
Andalusia the Regional Government considers the number of researchers when 
awarding public financing to research groups for their interannual activities. The 
involvement of a larger number of researchers means that a group can obtain more 
public financing from the regional government. 
 
Thus considering this question, this first hypothesis will enable us additionally to 
check the goodness of one part of the financing of research groups as a valid factor 
influencing the generation of technological knowledge. 
 
H2: The scientific capabilities of the research group are an item that positively 
influences the generation of technological knowledge. This assumes that the capabilities 
of the group are reflected by the number of researchers deployed. 
 
This hypothesis, supported by the previous empirical work of Miyata (2000), 
Owen-Smith and Powell (2003) and Schartinger et al. (2002), is also related, in the case 
that concerns us, with the regional financing of the research groups; therefore we will be able to check, the goodness of part of the regional policy for research in terms of the 
generation of technological knowledge. 
 
Additionally, the generic formulation of this hypothesis will enable us to 
introduce many finer points into the model, since the scientific capabilities of the group 
is a  variable that can be measured by several different indicators, as will be made more 
specific when the variables to be included in the model are discussed. 
 
H3: The research groups that are provided with more external financial resources from 
public funds will generate more technological knowledge. 
 
By the obtaining of financial resources of external character, we are referring in 
our case to the financing provided by the central government (the Ministry of Education 
and Science), which has traditionally financed basic and applied research in public 
research institutions. The existence of this financing is also an indication of the quality 
of the group as researchers. 
 
H4: The groups that are capable of capturing larger amounts of financial resources from 
companies will generate more technological knowledge. 
 
In our case, the existence of relationships between the research group and 
relevant companies is an item that will enable us to check if knowledge of the market 
and of the needs of the relevant productive sector, obtained through contact with such 
companies, is a determinant in the generation of technological knowledge. 
 
H5: The institutional profile of the research group will influence the generation of 
patents. 
 
In Spain, and therefore in Andalusia too, there are various different public 
bodies dedicated to research. The inclusion of this hypothesis is very appropriate now, 
not only because the way research is organised varies widely between institutions, but 
also because their policies in respect of the generation of patents are very different. 
 
 3. Methodology 
 
In order to establish the factors determining the generation of technological 
knowledge in the universities and  public research institutions of Andalusia, the 
approach will be to follow an adaptation of the classic empirical formulation of function 
of production put forward by Griliches (1979) and modified by Jaffe (1989), Feldman 
(1994) and Audrestch and Feldman (1996), to include the spatial dimension: 
 
PATi =f (Si, Pi, Ci) 
 
where the variable PAT measures the generation of technological knowledge in 
the universities and OPIs (public research institutions). 
 
The patents will theoretically be determined by a set of variables that can be 
grouped under three headings: S i is a set of variables related to the capabilities and 
scientific qualifications of the researchers; P i is a set of variables that measures the 
extent to which the researchers have public or private financing, and C i is a set of 
variables related to the characteristics of the researchers. 
 
There are various possible ways of treating this function of production 
econometrically: 
 
a)  If we intend to investigate the existence or absence of patents, it would be more 
appropriate to utilise binary response models. In this case, we opt for a Logit 
type model that determines the causes behind a researcher or research group 
seeking to patent an invention.
1 
 
b)  Secondly, the nature of the data suggests the formulation and estimation of a 
count model to quantify the intensity in the generation of technological 
knowledge (Poisson or Negative Binomial). The application of a Poisson model 
requires the assumption of equality of means and variances, a requirement that 
cannot always be met in practice. If the data show overdispersion, the standard 
                                                 
1 A formal presentation of this type of model can be found in Greene (2003). errors of the Poisson model will be biased towards the low end, thus providing 
high values for the individual significance statistics (Cameron and Trivedi, 
1986). The generally accepted model for avoiding this overdispersion is the 
Negative Binomial (NB2, in the terminology of Cameron and Trivedi (1986)). In 
this model, it is assumed that the variance is a quadratic function of the mean.
2 
 
c)  Thirdly, from observation of the data, with a significant number of observations 
with the value 0 (only a small proportion of all groups seek patents), it can be 
expected that the process that generates the data is formed by two regimes: one 
that defines the capacity for the generation of technological knowledge, and 
another that defines its intensity. A variant for dealing with the excess of zeros 
was presented by Lambert (1992) and analysed in detail by Greene (1994); it 
concerns the Poisson and Negative Binomial models with inflated probability of 
zeros, where the value zero can be originated by a binary process or by a Poisson  
process (or, where applicable, by a Negative Binomial process). 
 
In our case we opt for a first battery of models of binary type to determine what 
factors influence whether a research group seeks patents or not, and a second set of 
models for the count data utilising the models with inflated zeros, of both the Poisson 
and the Negative Binomial types. 
 




Pat: this is a dichotomous variable (1 if the group has obtained a patent, 0 if not). 




                                                 
2 The density function, the logarithm of the likelihood function, the first order conditions, and the rest of 
the statistical formulations and mathematics can be found in Cameron and Trivedi (1998). H (human resources) has been quantified taking the number of researchers with 
doctorates, graduates and support personnel in the research group (numinv) and by the 
number of those with doctorates in the group (numdr). 
S (Scientific capabilities) has been quantified by the number of scientific publications of 
international character by the research group (revinter) and the number of publications 
in journals of national scope (revnac). 
F (financial resources) has been obtained from two quantitative variables: one variable 
picks up the number of projects for which the group has or has not received external 
financing of public character (proyfin), and the other is the number of contracts for 
which the group has received private financing (conlru) (Internal financing -originating 
from the regional government- has not been incorporated because that is a direct 
function of the variables H and S)
3. 
O (Other characteristics of the research group): a set of binary variables has been 
included to capture the scientific area covered by the research group (agriculture -agr-, 
health sciences and technologies  -cts-, life sciences  -cvi-, physics, chemistry and 
mathematics -fqm-, production technologies -tep-, natural and marine resources -rnm- 
and information and communications technologies -tic). In this group of variables, two 
fictitious ones have been included to pick up the type of institution within which the 
group functions (university -univ-, higher council for scientific research -csic-, or the 




The region of Andalusia, from which the population of research groups has been 
extracted (the sample is of the comprehensive type) organises research utilising a 
structure of research groups according to the scientific areas in which they work. In the 
technical and scientific areas, i.e. those where there is the theoretical possibility of 
protecting an invention with a patent, there are 1155 groups; of this total, there is 
reliable data for 1146; these account for a total of 6,451 researchers with doctorates. Out 
of all these groups, a total of 167 have obtained one or more patents, producing a total 
number of 297 records of patents. 
 
                                                 
3 Information on the financial amounts of the Projects and Contracts with companies is not available. The groups belong to various different institutions; the majority are university 
research groups, although there are also groups belonging to the Junta de Andalucía 
(basically formed by researchers in public hospitals and regional research institutes) and 
to the Higher Council for Scientific Research (public research institutes for which the 
Spanish central government is responsible). 
 
Table 1 presents the variables considered for testing the hypotheses formulated 





  Mean  Std.Dev.  Maximum  Minimum 
PAT 0.145 0.352 1 0
NUMPAT 0.257 0.915 15 0
REVINT 16.503 16.758 117 0
CONGINT 13.806 15.093 118 0
UNIV 0.809 0.394 1 0
CSIC 0.094 0.292 1 0
PROYFIN 7.647 9.793 170 0
CONTLRU 2.104 5.850 86 0
NUMDR 5.629 3.424 31 1
NUMINV 10.028 6.026 66 2
AGR 0.096 0.296 1 0
CTS 0.281 0.449 1 0
CVI 0.134 0.341 1 0
FQM 0.181 0.385 1 0
TEP 0.087 0.281 1 0
RNM 0.157 0.364 1 0







  To test the initial working hypotheses, it was decided to propose different types 
of econometric model; this would also contribute to making the final conclusions more 
robust. 
 
  Given the nature of the data, the following models have been calculated: 
 - A first type, in which the dependent variable is a binary variable (PAT), in which the 
reasons why a research group has or has not obtained a patent are analysed. The model 
chosen is of the logit type. To test the influence of the size of the group on the 
dependent variable, we have calculated two models, with identical characteristics, in 
which the only change is that the variable NUMDR is replaced by NUMINV
4. 
 
- A second type of model, in which the dependent variable is a count variable 
(NUMPAT), in which the reasons why a research group presents either no patents or 
else a certain number of patents are analysed. The model chosen i s of the negative 
binomial type, which is preferred to that of the Poisson type and to that of the Zero 
Inflated Poisson and Negative Binomial one, in all the cases
5.  Also in this case, the 
importance of the size of the group has been tested with two variables. 
 
  To make the results more robust, three combinations of variables have been 
calculated: one with original data, another with logarithms in the quantitative variables, 
with the object of avoiding the dispersion derived from the size of the group, and the 
third with the explanatory quantitative variables relativized by the number with 
doctorates in the research group (NUMDR), in order to minimise the influence of the 
group size on the result, although in this case the interpretation will be related with the 
researchers productivity. 
 






















                                                 
4 We have estimated both models with identical results. We offer only NUMDR models. 
5 The models has been chosen using the common statistics (overdispersion, Vuong, etc.) and AIC, BIC 
and CAIC statistics suggested by Cameron and Trivedi (1998). TABLE 2 
MODELS WITH ORIGINAL DATA 
  Results of Logit models (dep 
var PAT). 
Results of Negative Binomial 
(dep var NUMPAT) 
Model I  Model III 
Coeff.  Std.Err.  Coeff.  Std.Err. 
ONE  -2.633 * 0.404 -4.142 * 0.925
REVINT  0.023 * 0.006 0.024 * 0.007
REVNAC  -0.027 * 0.012 -0.046 * 0.013
CSIC  0.689 * 0.270 0.565 ** 0.299
CONLRU  0.038 * 0.014 0.032 * 0.014
PROYFIN  0.006 0.010 0.027 * 0.013
NUMDR  0.044 0.030 0.076 * 0.033
AGR  0.011 * 0.416 2.072 * 0.682
CTS  -0.398 0.440 1.394 * 0.659
CVI  0.634 0.402 1.799 * 0.660
FQM  -0.179 0.416 1.539 * 0.647
TEP  0.416 0.451 2.621 * 0.726
RNM  -0.652 0.451 0.509 0.659
Alpha    3.504 ** 2.025
LR stat  117.878 * 233.107 *
McF Rsq  0.124
N obs.  1146 1146
* Sign. 5%; ** Sign.10%. 
 
TABLE 3 
MODELS WITH LOGARITHMS IN THE VARIABLES 
  Results of Logit models (dep 
var PAT). 
Results of Negative Binomial 
(dep var NUMPAT) 
Model I  Model III 
Coeff.  Std.Err.  Coeff.  Std.Err. 
ONE  -2.633 * 0.404 4.228 * 0.916
LREVINT  0.023 * 0.006 0.025 * 0.007
LREVNAC  -0.027 * 0.012 -0.044 * 0.013
CSIC  0.689 * 0.270 0.563 ** 0.300
LCONLRU  0.038 * 0.014 0.034 * 0.014
LPROYFIN  0.006 0.010 0.025 * 0.013
LNUMDR  0.044 0.030 0.398 * 0.192
AGR  0.011 * 0.416 1.922 * 0.655
CTS  -0.398 0.440 1.228** 0.637
CVI  0.634 0.402 1.652 * 0.635
FQM  -0.179 0.416 1.410 * 0.625
TEP  0.416 0.451 2.509 * 0.700
RNM  -0.652 0.451 0.347 0.641
Alpha    3.549 ** 1.951
LR stat  117.878 * 232.849 *
McF Rsq  0.124
N obs.  1146 1146








MODELS WITH VARIABLES RELATIVIZED 
  Results of Logit models (dep 
var PAT). 
Results of Negative Binomial 
(dep var NUMPAT) 
Model I  Model III 
Coeff.  Std.Err.  Coeff.  Std.Err. 
ONE  1.905 * 0.378 -2.418 * 0.516
REVINTW  0.145 * 0.034 0.170 * 0.039
REVNACW  -0.075 0.057 -0.291 * 0.077
CSIC  0.603 * 0.268 0.383 0.304
CONLRUW  0.136 ** 0.070 0.124 0.102
PROYFINW  -0.036 0.044 0.008 0.050
NUMINW  -0.028 0.076 -0.042 0.082
AGR  0.674 ** 0.388 1.249 * 0.527
CTS  -0.873 * 0.406 0.397 0.507
CVI  0.189 0.378 0.809 0.509
FQM  -0.524 0.396 0.576 0.501
TEP  -0.031 0.428 1.664 * 0.531
RNM  -0.996 * 0.428 -0.379 0.555
Alpha    4.456 * 1.081
LR stat  94.249 * 282.081 *
McF Rsq  0.099
N obs.  1146 1146






  With the object of researching the causes that influence the production of patents 
in public research institutions, and of answering the questions initially proposed, diverse 
empirical models h ave been formulated and estimated, leading to the following 
conclusions: 
 
1. The human resources that are deployed in the group is a determining element for the 
generation of patents. We only obtain an irrelevant variable when the number with 
doctorates, as a proportion of the total number of researchers of the group, is included
6.  
Therefore, any system of financing or stimulus to innovation linked to the dimension of 
the group will have the effect of increasing the technological results susceptible to 
patent protection. On this point, part of the regional policy for the financing of research 
groups, in which the dimension of the group constitutes a variable of distribution, goes 
in this direction. Even so, suspicions derived from a certain bias of dimension may 
                                                 
6 This case is not so important because we can not consider the rate of doctors a quality indicator; there 
are a lot of differences among scientific areas (laboratory personnel, etc). affect this variable, and although this bias may be minimised with the logarithm of the 
variable, it is always there. 
 
2. The greater the scientific capabilities of a group, measured by the number of 
publications of quality in international journals, the greater will be its capacity for the 
generation of patents. Opposed to this, the publications of national character, 
understanding these to reflect the work of research groups of less scientific quality, 
provide significant parameters but with negative sign. These results lead to the view that 
scientific excellence has a positive effect on the generation of scientific knowledge, 
while research that is more "local" in scope does not stimulate applications for patents. 
Therefore, the indicators of scientific quality linked to the award of projects or financial 
assistance constitute a valid system bearing in mind their incidence in the generation of 
patents. 
 
3. External financing linked to public research projects (measured by the number of 
projects awarded) has an effect on the propensity of a group to seek patents, and on its 
number of patents, although always in the negative binomial models. External financing 
linked to private research contracts with companies (measured by the number of 
contracts) also has a positive effect on the generation of patents, although, in this case, 
in both, logit and count models. 
Although the stimulus of research projects, traditionally those with a greater scientific 
than technological weight, is a useful incentive for generating patents, it appears evident 
that a more effective measure could be linked to stimulating contacts between 
companies and public institutions, since it is found that more research of the applied 
type arises from such contact, and it gives researchers more knowledge of the demands 
of companies. 
 
4. Differences between the types of institution are appreciated when it come to seeking 
patents. The differences in favour of the CSIC (Research institutes without teaching 
obligations)  appears in  all  the models, therefore we could speak of differences 
imputable to the institution, for reasons of organisation, policy on patents, etc. The 
CSIC has personnel working only in research, contrary to universities and Junta, and 
has a marked policy patent. This is not the case of universities and Junta. 
 5. The scientific areas better placed to generate patents are the fields related to 
agriculture (AGR) and production technologies (TEP); therefore a policy that aims to 
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